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COUNTERCYCLICAL PROVISIONS, A PARTIAL ANSWER TO DISASTER MYOPIA
This article contains the discussion made by Richard Herring after the presentation of 
the panel based on the book The Countercyclical Provisions of the Banco de España 
(2000-2016), that took place in Madrid at the first Conference on Financial Stability. This 
Conference was organized by the Banco de España and the Centro de Estudios 
Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI), on 24 and 25 May 2017. The article reviews several 
aspects of the provisions, in particular their consideration as a possible, although 
nuanced, answer to disaster myopia. In this regard, the accountants’ view on the 
provisions, the innovative elements incorporated by them, the revision of loss concepts 
and their interaction along the way with capital and provisions, are also part of the issues 
reviewed in the article. The relevance of stress tests and their relation with the Spanish 
countercyclical provisions together with a final reflection on the macroprudential policies 
are two additional pieces of interest addressed.
The Banco de España’s introduction of countercyclical provisions was a remarkable 
accomplishment. It was one of the first genuine examples of thoughtful, macroprudential 
policy. More fundamentally, it pioneered the concept of truly forward-looking banking 
supervision, which is only now being adopted in many countries, largely in the form
of supervised stress tests. And, of course, it has led to substantive accounting reforms 
more focused on the fair or true values of assets. The fact that this innovation was possible 
because the Banco de España could regulate accounting standards has caused me to 
reconsider my long-standing enthusiasm for the harmonization of accounting standards. If 
the Banco de España had been obliged to adopt an international standard 20 years ago, 
this experiment would never have taken place. That strikes me as a good argument for 
permitting countries some scope for experimentation. Although I continue to believe it is 
important to be able to compare financial results across borders, it might be wiser to place 
the emphasis on ways to translate national standards into some common standard rather 
than to impose the same standard on all countries.
What I particularly enjoyed about the book, The Countercyclical Provision of the Banco de 
España, 2000-2016, by Jesús Saurina and Carlos Trucharte – and the reason it should be 
of interest to readers who may lack a special interest in the Spanish experiment per se – is 
the detailed, comprehensive analysis of an important innovation in bank supervision. The 
literature contains several accounts of how financial innovations occur in the private sector, 
but the political economy of how innovations in bank reform take place is seldom studied. 
Much of the authors’ analysis of the reform in Spain resonates with my view of how banking 
reforms have often evolved in the United States. The authors carefully distinguish the 
differing perspectives of bank regulators, securities regulators, the tax authorities and 
managers of financial institutions each of whom may have a different view of how banks 
should take provisions against current income and accumulate reserves. Bank regulators 
are sometimes caricatured as “never having seen an increase in reserves they didn’t like”. 
In general bank regulators are primarily concerned with the maintenance of confidence in 
the banking system and so they tend to favor measures, such as increases in reserves or 
capital that provide additional protection against insolvency. 
In contrast, securities regulators focus on investor protection and the maintenance of 
fair and efficient markets. Their primary concern is that financial disclosures provide
a fair and accurate description of the bank’s financial condition. They tend to look 
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skeptically on any accounting practice that distorts current earnings and provides 
managers with discretion to manipulate income to smooth reported earnings over time. 
In the US, we have often seen tensions between the US Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and the bank regulators. For example, in 1987 and 1988, US banks set aside 
billions of dollars of reserves that were a belated acknowledgment of
the decline in value of their claims on developing countries. This generally pleased the 
banking authorities, but caused the SEC to question whether earnings had been 
substantially overstated in prior quarters.
In addition to the securities and bank regulators, the tax authorities also constrain and 
influence how decisions are made and reported regarding provisions and reserves. In 
general, the tax authorities take a dim view of accounting practices that reduce taxable 
income, including provisions that exceed objectively verifiable losses. This reinforces the 
innate tendency for managers to resist setting aside provisions against losses that may 
not occur.
The perspectives of bank executives also influence reported financial statements. 
Accounting rules often provide managers with some discretion about how they are 
applied. Not only does this lead to differences in reporting across banks, but also to 
differences in reporting by an individual bank over time. For example, a new management 
team may tend to over-provision markedly to get all the bad news associated with the 
prior managers behind it so future performance will not be clouded by past problems. 
But, apart from this circumstance, managers generally appear to prefer to under-
provision. This may reflect several factors. Perhaps, managers expect they will no longer 
be at the institution when negative events finally materialize. Or, perhaps, they believe 
the share price of their institution (and thus their compensation) depends on reporting 
stable and growing earnings. Whatever the reason, this behavior will not help moderate 
the cyclical pattern of bank lending. Under-provisioning during a boom will exaggerate 
profitability and lead to still more lending and the failure to have accumulated sufficient 
reserves during the boom period will intensify pressures for the bank to reduce lending 
to replenish its reserves and meet regulatory capital requirements.
Although constrained by banking and securities regulators and the tax authorities, 
accountants bring their own particular biases to the determination of provisions and 
reserves. An anecdote attributable to Charles Goodhart illustrates my view of many 
accounting conventions. Goodhart told a story of a man who was adrift in a hot-air 
balloon and had lost his way. He saw someone walking in a field below him and shouted: 
“Hello there. Can you tell me where I am?”. The man responded, “Yes, you’re in a balloon, 
ten meters above me”. The man in the balloon responded, “Ah, I know exactly what you 
do. You must be an accountant. You told me something that’s true, but absolutely 
useless”. Accountants are in the business of attesting to the accuracy of information and 
so they have an understandable preference for objectively verifiable measures. 
Unfortunately, such measures are often not relevant for decision-making. 
Accountants were not enthusiastic about the adoption of through-the-cycle provisioning 
because they were uneasy about attesting to potential future losses that could not be 
verified. Moreover, they justifiably believed they had reformed provisioning practices 
markedly by abandoning policies that required banks to set provisions to accumulate, or 
when necessary, disguise a decline in hidden reserves. Several countries required that 
banks accumulate hidden reserves that were disclosed to (and, presumably, verified) by 
the regulators, but could not be disclosed to the public under penalty of criminal law. 
2  The accountants
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Hidden reserves were intended to provide banks with a means to smooth income. The 
presumption was that if the public did not know about losses in income (and corresponding 
declines in reserves or retained earnings), confidence in banks would be maintained.1 
The Banco de España’s innovation of computing provisions over the cycle helped pave the 
way for more forward looking accounting reforms that have been adopted on both sides 
of the Atlantic. In countries that follow International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 
an Expected Credit Loss (ECL) model is being implemented and in countries that apply 
standards set by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, a Current Expected Credit 
Loss (CECL) model is being implemented.2 Both approaches reflect the spirit of the 
Spanish countercyclical provisions requirement.
The Spanish provisions also have the merit of providing a partial remedy to the age-old 
problem of the pro-cyclical influence of supervisors. Observers have frequently criticized 
the pro-cyclical impact of bank regulation, but the influence of supervisors tends to be
pro-cyclical as well. The influence of bank supervisors tends to diminish in an expanding 
economy when lending is growing rapidly and profits appear to be high. In most regulatory 
systems, bank supervisors have great difficulty in constraining a bank that is highly profitable 
and appears to have few realized losses even if supervisors believe the bank is increasingly 
vulnerable to future losses. Yet when a crisis arises, the influence of bank supervisors tends 
to soar. Often supervisors react to losses that have already occurred by pressing banks to 
increase their ability to absorb future losses. The Spanish innovation finesses this problem 
adroitly by providing a transparent, automatic rule that avoids the inherent problem of 
bargaining involved in the discretionary supervisory discipline envisioned in Pillar 2 of Basel II 
and Basel III. Moreover, the approach fits neatly with the turn-of-the-century paradigm 
about how capital regulation should work.3 If we assume we know the distribution governing 
outcomes for a bank, an admittedly heroic assumption, we can highlight an important 
distinction between reserves and capital. 
Chart 1 depicts the probability density function of losses for a bank over a year. The 
distribution is skewed to the right and has a relatively fat right tail consistent with the profile 
of a bank that bears considerable credit risk, which has limited upside, but substantial 
downside. The expected loss (the probability weighted loss associated with this density 
function) corresponds to the amount of reserves the bank should accumulate to absorb 
losses that are likely to occur on average over the year. Not surprisingly, Chart 1 shows a 
substantial probability the bank may lose much more than the expected loss it has reserved 
against. The role of capital is to serve as a buffer against this unexpected loss that exceeds 
the expected loss. 
Risk results from uncertainty about the magnitude of this unexpected loss. The amount of 
economic capital the bank decides to allocate to absorb unexpected loss will largely determine 
1  For example, this accounting flexibility enabled Credit Suisse to absorb a loss of Sfr1bn at its Chiasso branch in 
1977, by dissolving hidden reserves, without modifying its operating results for the year. In the wake of the Great 
Financial Crisis, it seems likely that confidence in banks and regulators has eroded to such an extent that that 
the public would be highly skeptical of this kind of accounting legerdemain. 
2  Both the ECL and CECL models may be viewed as a response to the concern expressed by the Group of 20 that 
credit loss provisioning was too little and too late during the Great Financial Crisis. In 2015, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (2015) issued supervisory guidance on credit risk and accounting for expected credit 
losses that sets out supervisory expectation for credit institutions that include incorporating a model of expected 
credit losses in establishing provisions.
3  After the Great Financial Crisis, the paradigm shifted from reliance on the assumption of known probability dis-
tributions to an emphasis on a bank’s ability to withstand a number of different stress scenarios.
3  The Spanish innovation
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its credit rating.4 Suppose the board of the bank depicted in Chart 1 aims to achieve an A 
rating on its long-term debt. To accomplish this objective, the board will need to allocate 
economic capital equal to the difference between the maximum sustainable loss associated 
with the probability of default on A-rated securities and the Expected Loss. This will reduce 
the probability the bank will incur a loss greater than its reserves and economic capital to 
0.03%,5 the probability of default on A-rated securities. In effect, the bank will need to allocate 
sufficient capital to cover 99.97% of the losses that may occur over one year in order to 
achieve the level of safety that the market demands from A-rated borrowers. (The blackened 
area under the curve in the far-right tail is drawn to equal 0.03% of the area under the curve). 
The left margin of this area determines the maximum sustainable loss consistent with a 0.03% 
probability of insolvency. If the board had opted for a less pristine target debt rating, say BB 
(which is associated with an historical probability of default of 1.32%), the amount of economic 
capital the bank would need to allocate would decline by about one third.
The board’s choice, however, is constrained by regulation. The Basel II rule required banks 
that adopt the internal ratings-based approaches to maintain sufficient regulatory capital 
to ensure that the probability of a loss would exceed regulatory capital was less than 
0.01%. At this level of confidence, a bank would be expected to suffer losses exceeding 
its level of regulatory capital once in a thousand years on average.6 As noted above the 
correspondence between economic capital and regulatory capital is highly imperfect and 
so the correspondence between the board’s choice of a target debt ratio and a bank’s 
minimum capital requirement is inexact, but the question was framed in a similar way.7
4  Economic capital should be distinguished from regulatory capital. For an especially clear discussion of these 
differences see Elizalde and Repullo (2007). Note that Elizalde and Repullo introduce a more sophisticated 
approach to determining the desired level of economic capital than the traditional model, which simplifies the 
problem by assuming that the board is simply choosing a target debt rating.
5  See Gupton, Finger, and Bhatia (1997), p. 76, for this estimate of the long-term average probability of default 
during one year for A-rated debt.
6  A number of documents issued by the Basel Committee describe this approach and its relationship to economic 
capital, but one of the most concise explanations is Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005).
7  Of course, if the correspondence between economic capital and regulatory capital were exact and banks were 
required to have sufficient capital to buffer against 99.99% of losses, we would expect banks to achieve much 
higher credit ratings than we observe. 
PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTION OF CREDIT LOSSES CHART 1
SOURCE: Author’s elaboration.
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The Spanish concept of dynamic provisioning contributes to a more precise determination of 
capital adequacy to the extent it strengthens the alignment between expected losses and 
reserves. The economic capital paradigm draws a clear distinction between reserves
and capital, but since the calibration of economic capital depends on both expected and 
unexpected losses, it is important to have an accurate estimate of expected losses to measure 
the amount of economic capital needed. If the estimate of expected losses is too low the 
bank will be undercapitalized even though it may meet the regulatory minimum. Excess 
provisions, on the other hand, should be counted as capital. The accounting and regulatory 
distinction between reserves and capital is not as clear cut as financial reports imply and so 
the Banco de España‘s effort to improve the accuracy of reserves is a welcome innovation. 
The concept of through-the-cycle provisioning is attractive but its implementation presents 
several difficult challenges in the context of the economic capital paradigm. We need to 
know how to interpret the distribution of losses. Conceptually, Chart 1 depicts the 
distribution of losses over a one-year period. But at what point in the cycle does the one-
year period begin? The loss estimates provided by the credit rating agencies are very 
long-term averages over many cycles. Markets, however, are less likely to take a long-term 
perspective. Market perceptions of the probability of default aggregate all current 
information and are more likely to be point-in-time rather than through the cycle. 
Although the concept of averaging losses over the cycle is appealing, it cannot be very precise 
since supervisors do not know the amplitude and duration of the current cycle, nor can they 
be certain about where the economy is in the cycle. This also raises the troubling question 
about how regulatory requirements regarding provisions can achieve credibility in markets.
Fundamentally, cycles are an ex-post concept. For example, we do not know where we are 
in a US business cycle until the National Bureau of Economic Research tells us. Often that 
is a considerably after a turning point. Consequently, we may be well into a recession (or 
possibly even into the early stages of a recovery) before a recession is officially declared. 
Yet, understanding the business cycle is highly relevant to getting the expected losses 
(and thus reserves) right. The solution embedded in Spanish approach is to make an 
estimate of through-the-cycle provisions based on the most recent cycle. This is plausible, 
but it should be recognized that it is an estimate based on one observation and thus will 
have a very large standard error of estimate. 
As a practical matter, the requirement for through-the-cycle provisions mandated banks to 
set aside a substantial additional amount of provisions relative to prior practice. Some 
have conjectured this may have had a perverse effect because market participants were 
so confident in the conservatism of the approach, they became complacent and overly 
confident about the health of the banking system. This perspective highlights the important 
role accounting policies can play, but strikes me as highly implausible. I think it much more 
likely that through-the-cycle provisioning did mitigate losses, but could not be expected to 
anticipate the magnitude of the losses that ultimately occurred. 
The book’s authors make an admirable attempt to address the problem of disaster myopia. The 
disaster myopia hypothesis is a way of reconciling two different observations about bank 
lending. First, “The worst of loans are made in the best of times”. Second, “Loan officers 
never intend to make a bad loan”. Both observations seem plausible, but they appear to 
be at variance. They can be reconciled under the assumption that lenders’ subjective 
probabilities of default tend to decline over a sustained period in which outcomes have 
been favorable. 
4  Challenges
to the implementation
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This assumption is based on the work of Tversky and Kahneman examining how people 
make decisions under conditions of uncertainty. They have conducted numerous 
experiments with many different samples of decision-makers from which they infer 
heuristics about how people actually make decisions (rather than how people should make 
optimal decisions). These heuristics are especially important in situations where people 
lack detailed a priori understanding of what causes an event to occur or do not have a 
sufficient empirical record to enable them to draw valid statistical inferences. The disaster 
myopia hypothesis8 relies on the availability heuristic [Tversky and Kahneman (1982)], a rule 
of thumb that implies people assign probabilities to events according to how readily they 
can imagine the event occurring. If an event occurs frequently, the heuristic provides 
relatively accurate estimates. But if the event occurs only after long, unpredictable intervals, 
the availability heuristic results in an availability bias. Chart 2 illustrates how the subjective 
probability of a disaster declines over time since the last occurrence of the disaster. For 
simplicity, the (unobservable) true probability of a disaster is assumed to be a constant. The 
downward sloping line reflects the assumption that π, the subjective probability of a disaster, 
will fall as the interval since the last occurrence of the disaster increases because decision-
makers find it increasingly difficult to imagine the event occurring.9
If the interval since the last disaster becomes very long, the subjective probability of a 
disaster may fall so low that decision-makers treat it as if it were zero. This is an example 
of the threshold heuristic.
The threshold heuristic was introduced in a classic article by Herbert Simon (1978) to describe 
how people allocate attention, one of their scarcest resources. Simon’s hypothesis was that 
8  The concept of disaster myopia in financial behavior was introduced by Guttentag and Herring (1984). It was 
applied to the exposure of international banks to funding shocks in Guttentag and Herring (1985) and to bank 
lending to less developed countries in Guttentag and Herring (1986). Herring (1998) applied the hypothesis to the 
interest risk exposures of US thrift institutions during the 1970s and to credit risk modeling in Herring (1999).
9  Real estate busts provide an example of this kind of low frequency disaster that seems to occur over long, but 
unpredictable intervals. See Herring and Wachter (1999) for the application of disaster myopia hypothesis to real 
estate lending with illustrations from several different countries.
DISASTER MYOPIA CHART 2
SOURCE: Author’s elaboration.
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decision-makers allocate their attention to events that seem likely to occur and, to some 
extent, to events that would have a devastating impact, but only if the subjective probability 
that such an event might occur is above some threshold, denoted in Chart 2 as π*. At point t+m 
in Chart 2, the subjective probability has fallen so low that it is treated as if it were zero. 
Simon argued decision-makers cannot possibly take account of all the low probability, 
disastrous events that might occur. Any attempt to do so would result in complete paralysis 
while the decision-maker simply attempts to list the possibilities. Thus, even though they 
cannot rule out the possibility numerous disastrous events might occur – for example, a 
meteor collision, nuclear holocaust or global pandemic – decisions are made as if the 
probability such events would occur were zero. Reliance on the threshold heuristic is crucial 
for rational decision-making, but when the availability bias combines with the threshold 
heuristic, decision-makers may unwittingly take excessive exposures to disastrous shocks. 
The disaster myopia hypothesis implies that this may happen in financial markets during a 
long period of euphoria when negative outcomes are comparatively rare and the last period 
of collapse has receded from the memories of many decision-makers. At this point, risk 
premia virtually disappear and leverage expands, not because decision-makers are 
consciously taking more risk, but because they believe that risks have diminished and so 
they can accept greater exposures without increasing their risk of insolvency. 
Of course, benign financial conditions do not last forever. Sooner or later, a shock will 
occur and institutions will find they have inadvertently taken excessive insolvency 
exposures. Note at this point, the availability heuristic continues to be important, but leads 
to an overestimate of the probability of a disaster because, when a shock occurs, it is all 
too easy for decision makers to imagine another disaster occurring. This contributes to the 
exacerbation of the crisis. This is denoted in Chart 2 as time t+n, when a severe shock 
occurs. The subjective probability of another shock will rise sharply above the true, 
unobservable probability of a disaster, which remains π’. The consequence is that risk 
premia will rise substantially so that many borrowers will be rationed out of the market and 
most will pay more for their funds. Leverage will decline. These sharp financial adjustments 
are likely to have very damaging impacts on the real sector, which will find it more expensive 
or, in some cases impossible, to finance investments and consumption. Chart 2 suggests 
that this boom/bust scenario may be repetitive. If the shock at t+n is followed by benign 
financial conditions, subjective probabilities of default will once again fall below the true 
probability. The longer the interval of relatively good outcomes, the more likely a feeling of 
euphoria will prevail and the subjective probability of a disaster may once again fall below 
the threshold and be treated as if it were zero.
Several institutional factors accentuate disaster myopic behavior. Managerial accounting 
systems implicitly favor activities subject to low-frequency losses. If the reporting period 
is a year and provisions do not reflect a long-run perspective, an institution will appear to 
be exceptionally profitable for many years before the disastrous event occurs. In 
competitive markets this is likely to lead others to believe a particular line of business
is very safe and profitable, and they will initiate or expand similar lines of business. This is 
where the countercyclical provisioning policy of the Banco de España plays an important 
role in countering disaster myopia. In effect the policy assumes that over the cycle bad 
outcomes will occur and so banks must set aside provisions this period because their 
current views about risk are likely to prove too optimistic. 
Although countercyclical provisioning does not deal specifically with managerial incentives, 
I suspect the Banco de España has also taken measures to counter other related accounting 
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practices that encourage disaster myopic behavior. A couple of decades ago, it was 
common practice for banks to recognize loan fees up-front as part of current income. This 
is potentially very deceptive because higher fees may be traded off against lower spreads 
in setting the terms of a loan. A sophisticated management information system would 
recognize this trade-off and focus on the present-value equivalent spread that states fee 
and spread income on an equivalent basis and provides a more accurate measure of the 
compensation the bank may earn from loans. But, when fees can be reported as current 
income, a bank may choose to do so to boost its reported earnings, perhaps under the 
assumption that loan growth will continue and fees will be a sustainable source of income. 
Of course, fees are part of the compensation for taking risk over the life of the loan, not just 
the current accounting period, and so this practice will favor growth over prudent risk 
management. The problem is exacerbated if loan officers are compensated based on 
current revenues they generate. This is likely to lead loan officers to prefer fee income over 
spread income because it will boost their compensation. The result will be a greater 
emphasis on loan originations and less attention to longer term outcomes. 
Even if decisions are not distorted by a management information system that favors fees 
over spread income, high job mobility among lending officers and those who manage them 
may also contribute to disaster myopic behavior. If the individual’s exposure to the risk of 
an unfavorable loan outcome is shorter than that of the institution, the decision-maker may 
focus on short-term returns without appropriate attention to longer-term risks. If individuals 
expect to be in another position or at another institution before bad outcomes, their 
personal exposure to the risk of an unfavorable outcome will not be aligned with that of the 
institution. Several policy initiatives since the Great Financial Crisis, such as requirements 
for deferred compensation and clawbacks, have attempted to deal with this problem, but 
their effectiveness remains uncertain.
As an economist I generally favor competitive markets, but I concede that in the case
of low-frequency, disastrous shocks, competitive markets can exacerbate the problem of 
disaster myopia. Competitive markets work well in disciplining institutions when 
unfavorable outcomes occur frequently. For example, if an institution is inept at assessing 
risk in consumer lending, where bad outcomes happen frequently, it will incur losses and 
be driven out of the market. But if a shock occurs only at long, but unpredictable intervals, 
this market mechanism may undermine the pricing of risk. Entry of new competitors may 
accelerate the process of driving down risk premia to levels that are inconsistent with 
financial stability. Real estate lending provides an example of this kind of behavior. Real 
estate cycles tend to be very long, with intervals between peaks measured in decades. 
Unless appropriate measures are implemented to risk-adjust profits, returns may look 
deceptively attractive for an extended period. This is likely to attract new entrants and 
expansion of real estate lending by incumbents. It may also incentive innovations that will 
enable non-bank players to enter the market. And, since the unknown interval between 
real estate collapses can be quite long, they may appear to be very profitable for several 
years. Under such circumstances, prudent lenders face an unpleasant dilemma. They can 
continue to lend and accept compensation for risk that they believe to be inadequate or 
they can exit the market. In a competitive market, they do not have the choice of setting a 
lending rate markedly above that of competitors. The case for through-the-cycle 
provisioning in this context is compelling, but very difficult to implement, even if a regulator 
could control accounting policies at non-banks as well as banks.
Of course, perverse regulatory incentives may encourage disaster myopia by enabling 
institutions to largely ignore tail risks. The finance literature documents several features of 
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the safety net that can lead to this kind of moral hazard. In addition, another consequence 
of official behavior in a crisis has received less attention. During a financial crisis, it often 
emerges that institutions have similar loan exposures. This may happen for several 
reasons, but one merits attention under the heading of perverse incentives. Banks routinely 
compare their own exposures to those of competitors10 at least in part because they 
understand that if they have an unusually large exposure to a particular kind of shock 
relative to their peers, if the shock occurs their problem will be viewed as idiosyncratic and 
is likely to receive much harsher treatment from the regulators than if the problem that 
materializes affects other major institutions. A banking system problem is much more likely 
to receive official assistance on favorable terms than an individual bank problem. To some 
extent, this undoubtedly leads to a tendency for banks to herd.
The tendency to herd may also be an unintended consequence of the emphasis on peer 
group analysis. Equity analysts, bond rating agencies and supervisory authorities tend to 
look at individual banks relative to their peers. If a bank’s profile is different from that of its 
peers it faces the burden of explaining why. This analytic approach is useful if the peers are 
soundly managed, the underlying premise of the approach. But this does not always prove 
to be true. The focus of the supervisory authorities should be on the risk profile of the peer 
group, without the presumption that the herd is prudent, because that is what matters 
most for financial resilience. 
More fundamentally, I suspect herding is a natural response to uncertainty about the risks 
banks face. When risks are uncertain, banks take reassurance if their decisions are in line 
with those of their peers. Keynes (1931) noted this tendency when he observed: “A ‘sound’ 
banker, alas, is not one who foresees danger and avoids it, but one who, when he is ruined, 
is ruined in a conventional way along with his fellows so that no one can really blame him”. 
From a decision-maker’s perspective, herding minimizes ex-post regret; if decision-makers 
prove to be wrong, they can draw comfort from the fact that their peers were making the 
same mistakes and avoid a considerable amount of blame. 
I believe that disaster myopia remains a threat to financial stability over the long run, but 
the Banco de España deserves credit for being one of the first regulatory authorities to 
design and implement a policy to curb disaster myopia. Efforts to harmonize national 
regulatory policies and accounting standards have brought an end to the Spanish approach 
to through-the-cycle provisioning.
The new regulatory emphasis on stress tests, however, incorporates the fundamental 
contribution of the Banco de España’s innovation. Stress tests are designed to be forward 
looking and to incentivize banks to incorporate possible losses under adverse scenarios 
into business models and capital planning. They can be tailored to emerging vulnerabilities 
and provide greater transparency about the kinds of shocks and magnitude of economic 
downturn banks should be prepared to withstand. Disclosure of stress test results 
enhances the public accountability of both banks and bank supervisors. When accompanied 
by qualitative standards regarding the governance of data and models, stress tests can 
substantially improve risks analysis.11 Repullo and Saurina (2012) highlighted a problem 
with the Basel III countercyclical buffer that I think applies with equal force to the difference 
between the countercyclical impact of stress tests relative to the Banco de España’s
10  In the US this process takes place as soon as 10-Q reports and Call Reports are available. 
11  Of course, stress tests have their drawbacks. They generally cannot credibly accommodate feedback effects 
that may be very important in a systemic crisis and typically apply only to banks, so that the systemic risks in 
other kinds of financial intermediation cannot be monitored in the same framework.
6  Stress tests
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pre-provisioning policy. Stress tests should substantially improve the ability of the banks 
to withstand a shock, however, once the shock occurs they cannot reduce the pressure on 
banks to reduce lending to remain in compliance with regulatory capital requirements. In 
contrast, the Banco de España’s through-the-cycle provisioning policy provided a 
transparent and automatic release of reserves without the need for the exercise of 
supervisory discretion. This may be a significant advantage, but it raises an issue that 
concerns me about many macroprudential policies. 
If buffers against loss are reduced during a crisis, how will equity and bond markets react? 
Most macroprudential policies are intended to release reserves or regulatory capital in a 
downturn to buffer the impact on borrowers. While this is desirable from a macroeconomic 
perspective, I’m skeptical that markets will react favorably. If a bank is seen to be reducing its 
capacity to withstand a loss just as the prospect of losses is increasing, I would expect the 
market reaction to be negative. That is one lesson I drew from the Great Recession in which 
regulators lost all credibility, especially in the United States, because they failed to anticipate 
the serious decline in financial conditions and their measures of capital adequacy were 
completely uninformative. I think that regulatory permission for banks to reduce their capacity 
to absorb losses either lowering provisions or regulatory capital requirements would have 
been greeted with enormous skepticism. Indeed, the signal may have had a perverse impact 
if the market viewed the reduction in prudential standards as an act of desperation. 
As the economic recovery began, several important banks in the US managed to return to 
profitability by reversing provisions that had been taken earlier when the outlook was less 
favorable. The market reaction to this boost in profitability was largely negative. These 
releases of reserves were regarded as non-recurring income and largely ignored. Would 
the outcome have been different if the US had employed a predetermined, transparent rule 
like the Banco de España’s countercylclical provisioning policy? I was not able to find an 
answer in this otherwise remarkably comprehensive analysis of the countercyclical 
provisioning policy. How did markets react when reserves were released during the crisis 
and approached zero? So many confounding factors occurred during the crisis that it may 
not be possible to answer the question, but I’m left with a sense of unease about the 
extent to which a countercyclical provisioning policy can mitigate a downturn. 
My conclusion, nonetheless, is that the rest of the world has learned a great deal from the 
Spanish regulatory innovation. I am grateful to the authors, Jesús Saurina and Carlos 
Trucharte, for have written a highly readable account of the experience with such great 
care and illuminating detail. 
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